Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War there were many who predicted that air power would play a decisive part in the next general European war. To what extent did the performance of Allied air forces in the European Theater of Operations from 1943 to 1945 confirm these predictions?

The Second World War was the first to be fought employing air power as an integral component of strategy. By mid-1940, the European Continent was under nearly complete control of Axis forces. As such, air power was seen as the only option for breaking the stranglehold.

The Allies’ projections for the European Theater of Operations can largely be summed up in two words: Strategic Bombing. Air power was used for other missions, notably insertions and reconnaissance, but the bombing mission was envisioned as the primary mission of aviation in the European Theater. This was based on technical developments that convinced military and political leaders of the bombers’ invincibility. The Allies planned to leverage this strength to strategically bomb both military and civilian targets. While the strategy was ultimately a success in contributing to defeating the Germans, unforeseen difficulties would mitigate much of the expected impact.

One major factor of the strategic bombing campaign was the understood need to include civilian targets. This reflected the new face of warfare borne out of the new possibilities for the use of air power, and advances in strategic thinking during the previous two decades.

Introduction

The Great war was the first widespread usage of technology on the battlefield, and much of the next decade was spent on developing improvements. Machine guns, tanks, electronic communications, and aircraft made their debuts. Aircraft were not typically integrated into strategic planning during the war, and air interdiction was a major lesson learned as aviation would be used to isolate the battlefield, such as attacking communication lines and close air support (CAS) to support ground troops. By the end of the conflict in 1918, aircraft had been widely employed by the major participants in bombing, reconnaissance, and communications missions. The following two decades were a time of great innovation in air power, such as enclosed cockpits, single wing designs, more powerful engines, and longer ranges.

There were three main factors driving the development of land-based air power. First, all parties wanted to avoid the carnage of the Great War, and aviation was seen as the quickest way to end the conflict based on the use of new technology. By organizing properly as an autonomous branch of the military, air forces could fully realize the new potential. The British were the first of the Allies to act, creating the Royal Air Force (RAF) at the end of the Great War, while the Americans continued to operate as a branch of the Army called the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF). They would use the conflict as an opportunity to build a case for separating the Air Forces from the U.S. Army.

Strategic Thinking on Military Aviation

Several figures were important during this period to developing aviation strategy. In 1927, Giulio Douhet, an Italian army general, wrote “The Command of the Air”, a treatise on the use of air power. He pointed out that during the Great War, the militaries employed the “illogical concept of utilizing the new aerial weapon solely as an auxiliary to the army and navy”, but that towards the end of the war the thinking changed towards using them for offensive missions. He was adamant that air forces should operate independently.

Douhet pointed out the value of being able to go “far beyond fortified lines” without requiring a ground attack to break through defenses, which would inform the thinking on how to avoid excess casualties. His most prescient writing though centered on the now gray line between military and civilian targets. He pointed out that the battlefield was no longer limited by artillery range. The battlefield could no longer be limited to actual combatants. Finally, “There will be no distinction any longer between soldiers and civilians.” It was an uncomfortable truth that had to be acknowledged: attacks on an enemy’s population centers would become the most effective use of air power, that would bring victory “cheaply and easily”.

Other advocates made similar arguments. General Billy Mitchell, a battlefield commander of air forces in the Great War, had been proclaiming the need for an independent air force since the early 1920’s. He believed that the enemy’s air force should be the first target of the air campaign. The U.S Army Air Corps Tactical School argued that “large formations of heavily armed bombers could fight their way through the enemy’s airspace without suffering unacceptable losses. General Jimmy Doolittle commanded heavy bombers in the Mediterranean, and warned his superiors that “that they had better develop long-range escort fighters or the strategic bombing effort was going to run into serious difficulties”. This directly contradicted the RAF belief that escorts were both unnecessary and unfeasible; and the American belief that they were simply not needed.

Strategic Plans

Two of the most important lessons learned from the Great war were air superiority and accurate targeting were paramount to successful air operations.” The philosophical advances in thinking on the use of military aviation resulted in a plan to rely on strategic bombing as the primary use of air power, though the two Allied powers did not agree on how to accomplish the two principal effects. First, there was resistance in both the RAF and USAAF to the idea of using escort fighters to secure the air space. There were also major differences in targeting between the two nations. This lied in the ideas of area bombing vs. selected targeting.

Both nations agreed that there was virtually no benefit to investing in escort fighters to protect bombers. The RAF during the 1920’s made a single-minded commitment to strategic bombing, and the American school of thought was that formations may suffer defeat, but these would be the exception rather than the rule. Thus, there was no need for long-range fighters. This idea would be disproven almost as soon as strategic bombing missions began.

The British believed in area bombing, a strategy informed by Douhet, who theorized that attacks on the enemy’s population centers would shorten conflicts and bring quick victory. Sir Arthur Harris was a proponent of this strategy. The Americans, however, would not plan to directly target civilians. Instead of indiscriminate attacks against civilian targets, select tactical targets such as oil, electricity, transportation, ball bearings, etc. To be sure, this was largely semantics as most of these facilities were operated by civilian populations. But an overt plan to bomb population centers or other civilian populations not directly involved in the war effort would likely not have been approved by the American Congress nor the public.

Another prescient development was the British air defense system. The RAF had the most advanced air defense system in the world. Air Marshal Hugh Dowding spearheaded research and development in radar, which informed further developments in the Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft. By 1939 the country had an air defense system that “integrated aircraft, radar, and communications into a coherent whole”. Were it not for this development, the Blitz and the Battle of Britain surely would have had a more devastating effect on the civilian population of London and other areas of Southeast England.

Execution

The problems with the strategic bombing plans were exposed from the start. Navigation, which directly affected targeting, was a major problem, with one report asserting that British bombers were “doing more damage to cows and trees than to Germany’s cities or industries”. This realization that they were not hitting much of anything finally forced Bomber Command to research technology to support efforts. The British were defeated in the Battle of Berlin in 1943- 1944 and did not resume bombing raids until later in 1944 after France was liberated. Sir Arthur Harris returned to bombing German cities and resuming the “area bombing” plan that he had championed early on.

Americans entered the conflict with a heavy focus on formation, mathematics, and calculations that placed precision worked out beforehand over actual combat experience. This led to a thinking that it was “perfectly feasible” for bombers to operate risk free at altitudes greater than 20,000 feet. This misplaced confidence in bomber fleets being able to identify and attack with precision vital targets without escort fighters, at a frequency and intensity to impact the German war production almost proved catastrophic. It was not until the bomber forces were built up to sufficient strengths that they were able to conduct raids into central Germany with success.

Americans would thus adopt a more Clausewitzian approach of remaining on the offensive, at least from the perspective of bombing missions, while employing the Sun Tzu concept of not excessively and indiscriminately destroying enemy targets.

Conclusion

“Success” is be a relative term. To describe success as the realization of the predictions of air power usage made prior to the war must factor in two main points: the British stuck to an area bombing plan largely to prove pre-war doctrine correct. And the Americans simply relied on the incredible output of heavy industry to overcome the misguided approach of the invincibility of bomber squadrons. In this respect, the predictions of air power in the European Theater would prove correct. Both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu believed in conducting honest net assessments both at the outset of war, and continuous re-evaluations. This was a massive failure of Allied strategy, as it was clear early on that both major Allied powers were blindly sticking to doctrines that had major flaws. There was ample evidence from reconnaissance missions and observations made on the ground, so it cannot be asserted that there was not the intelligence to adapt to the reality on the battlefield, one of Sun Tzu’s most important principles. We see that the Allied air doctrines were nearly impervious to empirical evidence and combat experiences.

In the theoretical and academic concepts of success developed in the interwar period, it could not be said that the air campaigns were a success. Douhet, the most important figure to this day in air doctrine believed that air power could mean a quick and cheap end to any conflict. This obviously was not the reality that was borne out.

There was a serious moral issue to address. The uncomfortable fact of the strategic bombing strategy, and the war in general, was the unavoidable fact that civilians would be killed. In a perversion of sorts of the pre-war precept of avoiding the carnage of trench warfare, much of the killing was transferred to civilian populations killed in British area bombing campaigns and American targeting of German industrial centers. Douhet called this a “brutal but inescapable conclusion”, but that the strongest army and navy would “prove no effective defense against determined efforts of the enemy to bomb our cities.” Thus, the only way to victory was to turn this strategy against the enemy and avoid a protracted war.

Sun Tzu stated that the most important fundamental factor in warfare is to assess the moral factors. Not morality in the traditional sense but ensuring that the people are in “harmony” with their leaders. Militaries, at least in liberal democratic societies, have a duty first to respond to the demands of civilian leaders and populations at home. If strategic bombing that inflicted civilian casualties was what it would take to win the war, then this would have to become the adopted approach. This is a classic application of Clausewitz’ maxim of using the both the maximum use of force and maximum exertion of strength. War is an irrational act. If it was truly believed that targets containing civilian populations would lead to an Allied win, it had to be included as part of the strategy.

Finally, Clausewitz’ “Paradoxical Trinity” is one of the foundational concepts used in strategic analysis. He described it as a balance between the people, military, and government; all parties having different passions pulling them in different directions. For a strategy to succeed, it must consider all three corners of this triangle and live somewhere in the middle, careful not to drift too far in favor of one party at the cost of the others. If we gauge success on this concept, the Combined Bomber Offensive was a success. The air forces proposed their respective strategies and largely stuck to them, despite the tactical problems; civilian leaders backed the plans and funded additional research and new programs despite it turning into a war of attrition; and the people continued to support the effort as the basis of enormous production totals despite the loss of lives.

We see then that the paradoxical triangle was indeed balanced, and the strategy was a success. Other uses of aviation, such as reconnaissance and insertions, also proved crucial to the allied strategy despite not being a major part of the strategy at the onset. But it is a sad truth that while these innovations did help, allied victory came at an appalling cost to civilian lives.

Works Cited

Clausewitz, C. v. (1976). On War. (M. Howard, & P. Paret, Eds.) Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Douhet, G. (1998). The Command of the Air. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program. Handel, M. (2001). Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. London: Cass.

Kagan, D. (1995). On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace. New York: Anchor Books.

Murray, W., & Millett, A. R. (1996). Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Murray, W., & Millett, A. R. (2000). A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Princeton University Press. (1986). Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. (P. Paret, Ed.) Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Satterfield, G. (2022). From Tragedy to Triumph: The Allied Victory Over Nazism. United States Navy War College Strategy & War Course. Newport, Rhode Island.

Tzu, S. (1963). The Art of War. (S. B. Griffith, Ed.) London: Oxford University Press.

Weinberg, G. L. (1994). A World at Arms. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Was Patriot success in achieving independence due more to the strategic skill of George Washington, or to the operational and strategic mistakes of the British?

The American Revolution is an interesting study in that at the outset, it can be seen as both certain victory or certain defeat for either side, depending on one’s sources, viewpoints, and opinions. George Washington, while at the war’s end was a hero and seen as the father of his country, lost his fair share of battles. Similarly, the British were the leading world power at the time but made many strategic decisions that exposed weaknesses the Patriots were able to exploit. In the end it took an astute and prudent commander in chief to capitalize on his opponent’s failures; but without those failures the war, and history, may have gone the other direction.

While Washington made many tactical mistakes, he could not be accused of not learning from them. He realized after Patriot defeats early in the war that he was facing a vastly superior foe and would have to fight a different kind of war that included small battles, periods of inactivity, and counter-offensives and strategic retreat. These tactics would later be described (but not attributed) by Mao as the three stages of the protracted war, which the Chinese Communist Party used to subjugate China. (Zedong, p. 74) He described it as a weapon of the weak used to wear down a stronger opponent, which is a strategy that has been proven effective by insurgent movements throughout history. Washington learned early that the path to victory lay in keeping the so-called ‘Spirit of ’76’ alive and stringing along the war as long as possible to wear his opponent down.

In 1792, a British consul to the United States met with President Washington and reported that Washington was “a great man…but I cannot help thinking, that the misconduct of our commanders has given him the principle part of that greatness”. This adequately sums up the popular sentiment in Britain at the time, that the failures of their military and civilian leadership were the greatest cause of the Patriot victory. And while the passage of time has placed some Washington’s legacy in context, we can see that despite his shortcomings as a tactical commander, his superior strategy played just as large a part in Patriot victory as British failures. This paper will examine both British and Patriot actions in the first two years of the war (1774- 76), and how events were set in motion that would lead to an eventual Patriot victory.

Washington’s Strategy

The early years: 1774-1777

The late 18th century in the American colonies was rife with political geniuses. Pamphleteering was the most common method of publishing opinions. One of the most accurate prognostications was written in 1775 by Alexander Hamilton, then a 19-year-old student at King’s College (later Columbia University) when he wrote that Britain could not win a war with the colonists. Among his predictions were that France and Spain would come to the Americans’ cause; the colonists could “evade a pitched battle” and “harass and exhaust the [British] soldiery”; and that redcoat attrition would force British leaders to abandon the war, despite its superiority (Ferling, pp. 107-108).

Washington committed a series of tactical mistakes in the summer of 1776 that might easily have quickly ended the conflict in the first year. He passively permitted General Charles Lee’s plan of defense of New York and sent home hundreds of cavalrymen to Connecticut, telling them “they could be of no use” as his experience fighting in thick forests in the French and Indian war did not give him an understanding of the value of mounted troops. He was uncertain about where the British would strike next, and instead of convening a Council of War to discuss the matter tried to cover all openings, committing the worst mistake of all: dividing his forces in the face of a superior foe.

The mistakes during the New York campaign mounted. He changed commanders on Long Island, did not reconnoiter the area, and allowed General Israel Putnam to string his men along a six-mile-long ridge. As the British began to march, they went undetected due to the absence of cavalry units and flanked the rebels. A pitched battle followed, the rebels were routed and fell back to the protection of the Brooklyn redoubts. Washington called a council of war and ultimately called for an evacuation of Long Island.

The commander was shaken by the string of defeats, and it substantially changed his approach to conducting the war. He believed that the path to victory lay in avoiding large scale offensive operations and to avoid nearly every risk unless backed into a corner from which he must fight to escape. He vowed to dictate when and where to fight and never hazard his entire army in a single engagement, and “bring the enemy to its knees through the attrition of men and treasure in the course of a long war.” (Ferling, p. 172) Ironically, Generals Horatio Gates and Charles Lee originally proposed similar strategies earlier that year (Fischer, pp. 79-80), which Washington would partly or wholly adopt for the defense of New York. However, after the nearly disastrous results and narrow survival of his army, he would make it his strategy for the remainder of the war.

His new approach would not result in the immediate end of Washington’s mistakes. A month later, in the face of annihilation in Harlem Heights, Washington did not attempt to escape Manhattan Island. He even admitted that he did “not know of what plan of conduct to pursue”, and that “I am bereft of every peaceful moment”. Once again, he was devoid of a tactical plan, but was rescued by a combination of British failures and Congressional action. The British dithered and when finally moved into action had poor maps and faulty intelligence; and Congress rushed General Lee to New York, who urged Washington to get the army off Manhattan forthwith. General Nathanial Greene argued for the defense of Fort Washington, to which the Commander in Chief agreed “against his better judgement” (Fischer, p. 111). This would be his final failure in the New York campaign. On November 16, 1776, General Howe launched an assault on the Fort as Washington watched from across the Hudson River as Greene evacuated what was left of his troops.

Washington was despondent and began to weep. This moment was the low point of his military career, and although we now see it as a singular defeat in a long war, at the time it must have felt like all was lost. However, the character trait that he was famous for would take over in the moment: resiliency. He gathered himself and ordered the army to retreat into New Jersey to fight another day. After the famous crossing of the icy Delaware river on Christmas night, 1776, the army would achieve much needed victories (and morale boosts) at Trenton and Princeton.

The blunders were no secret and were discussed during the Congressional debate over his nomination as commander in chief of American forces. He made numerous mistakes as commander of the Virginia Regiment during the French and Indian War, and in the New York campaign, but the Virginian congressmen emphasized his courage and firmness, his knowledge of organizing and administering and army, and his ability to lead men. (Ferling, p. 124) In the end, there was hardly another man who had the stature and political backing of Washington. When his appointment was secured, he placated Congress by expounding his assurance that military officials must be subservient to civilian authority. This public display of his enlightened views perhaps more than any other single deed helped secure the image that he was sacrificing everything for his country.

The General would not disappoint Congress for placing its faith in him. No more would he hamstring himself with focusing on preparations for a single battle. Clausewitz would later write (not speaking of Washington) that “A commander-in-chief…must aim at acquiring an overall knowledge of the configuration of…an entire country” (Clausewitz, Howard, & Paret, p. 110). This is exactly how Washington would treat the rest of the war, by appointing field commanders to fight the battles, deploying spies to implement an intelligence network, and using his considerable sway to focus on one of the most desperate causes of all, logistics.

The Southern Theater: 1777-1781

The bulk of the war in the early years took place in the north. New England, especially Boston, was the hotbed of Patriot passions. New York was a Tory stronghold, and the Congress was meeting in Philadelphia. After the battle of Saratoga in 1777 and battles throughout New Jersey in 1778, the armies settled into a sort of stalemate.

In 1779, the British began a “hearts and minds” campaign to pacify the public throughout the south. There were a few notable battles such as Cowpens, South Carolina, but the war during this time mostly consisted of Fabian tactics. Washington had sent Nathaniel Greene south to take command of the southern theater. This was a prescient decision by Washington as he and Greene were in lock-step with regards to strategy, namely that the strategy the Patriots would continue to prosecute was one of skirmishes, avoidance, and living to fight another day. In this period of the war, Washington made one of his most important strategic decisions that would directly influence the outcome, and the British mistakes were numerous. These will be discussed later.

British mistakes

Early Assessment: Crushing the Rebellion

That Britain could lose her colonies was unthinkable. The eight years preceding the war, beginning with the protests against the Stamp Act in 1766, were spent putting down “dangerous” revolutionary principles, and even moderates such as Adam Smith were convinced that retaining America was vital to British survival. (O’Shaughnessy, p. 4) Britain had a professional army, the largest navy in the world, seasoned officers, military supplies, and ample credit. It was the world’s strongest economy and fast becoming an industrial nation. No wonder contemporaries foresaw an easy triumph.

As the saying goes, history is written by the victors. To be sure, most history of the American Revolution is written from the Patriot point of view depicting the British as making a series of mistakes that the Continental Army was able to take advantage of. This may be true. But history must be taken in context, and we must consider that a strategic blunder in the eyes of the Patriots may have been a deliberate decision by the British in favor of another theater of British engagement. After 1778, Britain was fighting a global war against France, which expanded to include Spain and the Dutch. She was alienated from Russia and Austria and had to hold colonies on nearly every continent. Essentially, Britain was isolated (O’Shaughnessy, p. 13).

They were fighting a counterinsurgency campaign from an ocean away, where weeks and months transpired for men, materials, and communications to arrive. Although the shooting started with the battles of Lexington and Concord in the fall of 1775, the Patriot cause had been building for years. Among the early wins were taking over local governments and ousting imperial officials. By 1774, the British had essentially vanished from Massachusetts except for the military garrison in Boston (Ferling, p. 87). This is significant as it signified early on that the Patriot cause had to be taken seriously as they were demonstrating self-government from the start, which is vastly different than an insurgency movement that does not offer any hope of long-term sustainment. The next year, the first major engagement of the war would convince the British of the seriousness of the threat.

On June 17, 1775, General Henry Clinton led the of Breed’s Hill and Bunker Hill. The British won, but at such a cost that Clinton later wrote “a few more such victories would have shortly put an end to British dominion in America” (O’Shaughnessy, p. 86) as the British suffered nearly 50% casualties. After the debacle, Lord North, the British Prime Minister, declared that this had to be treated as a “foreign war” (Ferling, p. 133). He ramped up enlistments, and expected French and Spanish involvement, planning to treat this conflict the same as one with a major European power.

Tory support in the colonies was on the wane as well. Virginia’ Royal governor, the Earl of Dunmore, committed a series of offenses that turned public sentiment sharply towards the Patriot cause. Emboldened after conducting successful raids again Virginia militiamen, he issued the Dunmore Proclamation, which promised freedom to slaves that escaped their masters and joined the Tory cause. He then went on to fight the Battle of Great Bridge, and while this was a loss he torched some 900 homes, warehouses, and business in Norfolk. This series of actions throughout 1775-76 instituted a British image of barbarians. Samuel Adams predicted that the population would be so disgusted that it would lead to “accomplish[ing] a Confederation” of states, and Edward Rutledge observed that the Dunmore Proclamation had done more “to work an eternal separation…than any other expedient, which could possibly have been thought of”.

The spring of 1776 meant supply problems for Howe. He was stuck in Nova Scotia for weeks waiting for transport ships with food, horses, and men before he could begin his campaign. As such he did not embark for Staten Island until well into the sweltering summer. Additionally, the Hessians mercenaries did not arrive until August, 125 days after setting sail from Germany. Due to these delays, Howe’s entire summer campaign was delayed. Had the logistical issues been resolved earlier, the Patriot force may have been routed out of New York earlier in the year. If Washington had not crossed the icy Delaware River in the middle of the night on Christmas and instead a few months earlier, Howe may have been able to capture Philadelphia and destroy Washington’s army in New Jersey.

Hearts and Minds

Guy Tarleton was the British commander in the southern theater, which included Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia (Georgia saw limited action as it was largely rural at this time). By 1778 the war was turning into a protracted conflict that demonstrated the Patriot resolve. The south, having a larger population of Tories, was seen as a possible British stronghold and it was decided that a campaign to pacify the civilian population of the south was needed. The ports of Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah were seized, and armies moved to the interior of these states.

By 1780, Cornwallis was waging uncontrolled war in the south. General Horatio Gates was excoriated after fleeing from the battlefield at Camden (South Carolina). Washington, having remained in the north awaiting an opportunity to retake New York, needed an able commander in the south to execute his strategy. In October of the same year he named Nathaniel Greene commander of the southern forces. Again, Washington’s ability as an administrator shined. Greene was not only Washington’s most trusted subordinate, but more importantly also a student of Fabian tactics (Ferling, p. 274).

He prosecuted the war exactly as Washington would have wished. Greene understood how to employ militias and used them to score a victory at Cowpens. He also understood his enemy. Guy Tarleton was known as an extremely aggressive field commander that would throw caution to the wind at a chance for a win. After the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, Greene fled to the north knowing that Tarleton could not resist the pursuit. This was classic Fabian tactics, as well as one of Sun Tzu’s most famous quotes: “know thyself, know thy enemy”. (Tzu)

Patriot Victory

1781 saw a series of events that would lead to the Battle of Yorktown, where the British troops led by General Cornwallis would be trapped between the Patriots and the York River. Cornwallis withdrew from South Carolina after the defeat at Guilford Courthouse and marched his army to Virginia to rest and resupply, selecting Yorktown on the Virginia Capes. Tarleton chased Greene north. The French fleet under the Marquis de Comte arrived at the Capes, and Washington raced south.

This battle would be the culmination of both Washington’s strategic brilliance and the British failures, and the beginning of the end of British colonial rule in America. Cornwallis surrendered in 1781 to end the fighting, but the war was not over yet. Yorktown weakened British resolve like no other battle to this point, and Whigs were overwhelmingly elected to parliament. They negotiated an armistice and Patriot’s cause was rewarded with full independence and diplomatic recognition in 1783.

Analysis

The Americas were a British colony like no other up to that point. While there were many British mistakes that contributed to Patriot success, the British in hindsight were probably faced with a set of circumstances that made keeping the colonies within a virtual impossibility. A Patriot defeat would have required the British to divert resources from elsewhere in the empire, thus weakening its posture in other colonies. Additionally, George Washington had a unique character forged by his upbringing, experiences in the frontier during the French and Indian War, and fear of failure and destitution. This drove him to treat the revolution as a war of patience.

What cannot be quantified is the effect that chance had on the outcome of the war. Even more, much has been written about the Patriot cause being preordained, destined, or fate. There are so many pivotal points where the Patriot army escaped narrowly to fight another day that one has to wonder what hand fate or divine intervention played. Inflicting a Pyrric victory upon the British at Bunker Hill; narrow escapes from New York and Long Island and the victories at Trenton and Princeton could all be seen in this light if one wishes. But this does not give credit to human events and free will. Both parties set their strategy: Washington, with the support of Congress; and Howe, Clinton, and the other British generals with the support of Lord North and King George III. The major difference here was that the Congress understood and backed Washington’s strategy. While they were fighting a war to remove the British from the continent, the tactical goals were to fight for survival and harass the enemy when possible, without undue risk to Continental forces.

The British, however, had a major disconnect between civilian and military leadership. As noted earlier, Lord North treated the conflict like a foreign war, and King George, while reluctant to fight at first, was convinced he needed the destroy the Patriots (O’Shaughnessy, 2013). The generals and admirals, however, treated the conflict as if they were putting down a rebellion, which simply was not a correct assessment of the situation. The point where the forces for independence began to spread can be generally pinpointed is after the Stamp Act was enacted in 1765. Thus, by the time fighting broke out there had been nearly ten years of attempts on both sides to reconcile.

While the Patriot cause was by definition a “rebellion”, the reality is that Lord North was right that it had to be treated like a foreign war, as many Americans already considered themselves as non-British subjects by the time the Declaration of Independence was signed. After July 4th, 1776, the sentiment only grew.

Conclusion

George Washington’s record of tactical failures is well documented, but this might testify to his strategic brilliance: he knew his own limitations and installed field commanders that would execute his strategy. He was a master of administration, which meant that not only did he possess a strategic mind, he knew how put the right people into the right roles to enable execution. Finally, he had that most intangible of qualities, a magnetic persona. His taciturn nature was perceived as steely cool and confident, which inspired the bravest of acts from those who served under him.

The British were not opponents of liberty. In fact, they saw themselves as upholding the principles of parliamentary government, and their early assessment was that the revolution was due to a small minority of rebels who wanted to seize power and declare independence. This may be the largest strategic failure of all, and fairly attributed as the root cause of British defeat: underestimating one’s enemy. The British waged an 18th century war against a fiercely dedicated opponent that was willing to discard all orthodox military strategy in favor of any tactic that would lead to victory.

It is impossible to characterize with certitude the American Revolution as a Patriot success or British failure. There were so many moments where Continental forces narrowly escaped certain destruction, and momentum could have easily swung in the other direction, that one could fairly say luck, fate, or even destiny was at play. But the outcome speaks for itself. The strategy was to eventually wear the British down and outlast they did. Despite the miscues and blunders from the British, it took a brilliant commander like Washington to capitalize and seize victory.

Works Cited

Clausewitz, C. V., Howard, M., & Paret, P. (1976). On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ferling, J. (2015). Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Fischer, D. H. (2004). Washington’s Crossing. New York: Oxford University Press.

O’Shaughnessy, A. J. (2013). The Men Who Lost America. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Zedong, M. (n.d.). Selected Readings 1926-49. Bejing: Chinese Communist Party.